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MONEY AS A THUMB ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCALE: WEIGHING 
SPEECH AGAINST PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman* 
Abstract: When courts in right of publicity cases deal with claims against 
defendants arising outside the context of commercial advertising but in-
volving what judges nonetheless deem to be commercial uses, the typical 
approach is to “balance” a defendant’s right of free speech (that is, her 
right to use information legitimately in her possession) against a plaintiff’s 
exclusive right to control commercial uses of her persona. Considerable 
variation exists among the tests used to determine when a use is “commer-
cial” rather than purely expressive, but if the defendant has crossed the 
line drawn by a given jurisdiction, then her constitutional liberty interest is 
quite likely to be treated as inferior to the property interest in her persona 
claimed by the plaintiff. This Article takes the position that balancing eco-
nomic interests against constitutionally protected speech rights, while not 
always forbidden, is generally impermissible and cannot be justified, con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence. 
Introduction 
 Over the past decade, an increasing number of academic com-
mentators (and the occasional court) have turned their attention to the 
First Amendment implications of copyright, attempting to discern how 
and when free-speech principles should limit the expansive rights that 
copyright currently conveys.1 Less attention has been paid to what is 
happening outside the boundaries of copyright, where a different set of 
intellectual property rights are increasingly relied on to “fill in the 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2009, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Samuel Tilden Professor of Law Emerita, New 
York University School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 
(10th Cir. 2007); Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007); C. Edwin Baker, First 
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891 (2002); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright 
Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1275 (2003); Erwin Chemer-
insky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is 
Unconstitutional, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 83 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for 
Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance 
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
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blanks” of copyright protection—often those very same “blanks” that 
copyright and free speech scholars have concluded are constitutionally 
required. 
 Think, for example, about the core fact/expression limitation on 
copyright. In the 1991 case Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vice Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that facts could not be protected 
by copyright.2 Instead of ending all attempts to protect factual informa-
tion, Feist resulted in advocates of protection searching for ways to use 
common law or statutory responses to fill that “unfortunate” gap in 
copyright’s coverage.3 In their concern over limiting copyright, First 
Amendment scholars frequently fail to take into account the resilience 
of peri-copyright intellectual property law and its usefulness to those 
who remain convinced that all valuable resources, including informa-
tion, ought to be owned.4 
 Peri-copyright protections for information are not uniformly prob-
lematic from a free speech perspective; some fit quite comfortably into 
the traditional First Amendment framework of analysis. Much of trade 
secrecy, for example, is consistent with a tradition that privileges the 
right not to speak. Similarly, unfair trade practices doctrine, which pe-
nalizes false indications of source and manufactured “endorsements,” 
fits with the general First Amendment notion that harmful and mis-
leading speech is unprotected. But peri-copyright does not stop at pro-
tecting trade secrets or protecting against falsehoods. It often silences 
speech that is either creative or factually accurate and publicly known 
on the grounds that the plaintiff’s interest in controlling the use of the 
information “outweighs” the defendant’s speech rights. 
 The idea that free speech principles must accommodate intellec-
tual property claims has credibility in copyright because both interests 
are protected by the Constitution. Unless one believes (and I am not an 
advocate of this position) that ratification of the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                      
2 499 U.S. 340, 361–64 (1991). 
3 See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (attempt-
ing to use state misappropriation law to protect facts not covered by copyright); see also J. 
H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific 
Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
315 (2003) (discussing legal protections for scientific data and databases, in part inspired 
by the ruling in Feist). 
4 See Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale? Rights of Publicity in the Digital Age, 4 
Green Bag 2d 357, 363 (2001) (suggesting the need to resist the impulse to subordinate 
intellectual property protections in the face of free speech interests). See generally William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 471 
(2003) (arguing for indefinite renewal of valuable copyrights). 
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wholly displaced the copyright clause, a middle ground between the 
sometimes conflicting goals of free speech and incentivizing authors 
must be identified. It is harder, however, to understand the justification 
for saying that speech principles must be balanced against forms of in-
tellectual property protection that have no constitutional status. The 
existence of the First Amendment creates a presumption in favor of the 
speaker and her choice of what to say and how to say it. Admittedly, 
speech rights are not absolute and must give way in unusual cases 
where other compelling interests—protection of human life or safety or 
national security, for example—hang in the balance.5 The countervail-
ing interests in a typical non-copyright intellectual property cause of 
action, though, are not nearly so dramatic: they are instead the plain-
tiff’s preference for privacy, image control, money, or all three. One 
might legitimately ask, therefore, whether any of these interests qualify 
as sufficiently compelling to allow them to climb onto the constitu-
tional scale and potentially outweigh a defendant’s freedom of speech. 
 This Article will illustrate this analytical puzzle by focusing on the 
right of publicity, an intellectual property right in the personal charac-
teristics and other aspects of an individual’s persona that identify him 
or her to the public. Names,6 tag lines,7 implicit references8—all these 
and more are elements that plaintiffs can claim to “own.” A defendant 
who appropriates any part of that property for purposes a court or leg-
islature is willing to characterize as “commercial” can be required to 
pay damages and can be hit by an injunction against further use.9 In 
short, within a sphere identified by courts or statutes as having more to 
do with money than with conveying information, publicity rights serve 
to allocate the potential value associated with an individual’s persona in 
much the same way that copyright allocates value in expression cap-
tured in fixed works of authorship. 
 There is currently broad (although perhaps misguided10) agree-
ment that this state of affairs is wholly unobjectionable as long as an 
owner of publicity rights asserts his claims against commercial advertis-
                                                                                                                      
5 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
6 Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
7 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835–37 (6th Cir. 1983). 
8 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992). 
9 Notably, however, even the most avid defender of publicity rights acknowledges that 
this property interest cannot trump all unlicensed uses of such data, especially uses that 
convey news. 
10 See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 
DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 35 (1998) (criticizing developments in evolution of the 
right of publicity). 
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ers.11 Because these cases are entangled with the complexities of the Su-
preme Court’s commercial speech doctrine, I will not consider them 
here.12 What I will focus on instead are publicity claims that seek to limit 
uses of the persona as an expressive component of an end product itself. 
Examples include the use of a celebrity’s face on a tee shirt, on a poster, 
in an entertainment vehicle, or in a photograph offered for sale. Accep-
tance of the idea that these kinds of uses are commercial and, therefore, 
fall within the plaintiff’s proper area of control is extremely widespread. 
Indeed, cautious would-be users routinely assume the need to clear pub-
licity rights along with copyrights if, for example, they want to utilize 
shots from a photo archive for anything except news reportage. 
I. Three Approaches to “Commercial” Use and Free Speech 
 Plaintiffs in publicity cases, like owners of copyrights, make in-
fringement claims for many reasons. Some are interested almost en-
tirely in control: they want to decide whether to permit any uses of their 
personas at all, and, if so, which uses and users to accept. Others see 
their images in terms of dollar signs: they want to exploit the economic 
potential of their public images as fully as they can. Some want both.13 
Whatever the motives that drive plaintiffs to claim this property right, 
the legal hook is always money. The “bad thing” that virtually all unsuc-
cessful defendants have done in publicity cases is to have tried to gain 
some “unjustified” financial benefit from using the plaintiff’s persona.14 
According to publicity advocates, if that is the defendant’s objective, 
granting damages and injunctive relief does not encroach on free 
speech values because the First Amendment does not entitle anyone to 
                                                                                                                      
11 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. a (1995). 
12 For a discussion of this issue, see Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 67–74. 
13 For example, the legal successors of Martin Luther King, Jr. have used both publicity 
and copyright claims to exert control over the late civil rights leader’s heritage. Sometimes 
the objection appears to be based on grounds of taste. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for 
Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982) (plaintiffs 
“seek to prevent the exploitation of [King’s] likeness in a manner they consider unflatter-
ing and unfitting”). At other times, the objection is more about money. See Estate of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999) (asserting copyright 
claim to prevent defendant from using its footage of “I Have a Dream” speech without 
payment of copyright royalties). See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Hu-
man Dignity, the First Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1345 (2009) (dis-
cussing whether dignity harms, as opposed to economic harms, should impact the analysis 
in right of publicity cases). 
14 Whether the defendants were successful or not in their attempts to profit from the 
persona is irrelevant. 
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divert potential profits from the pocket of the person who created the 
value in the first place. 
 Why this explanation is less than satisfactory can be illustrated viv-
idly by the speech consequences of the recent Tony Twist litigation.15 
Former hockey player Anthony “Tony” Twist sued the publisher and 
creator of the famous comic book series, Spawn.16 Twist, in real life, has 
been described as having once been the National Hockey League’s 
“preeminent ‘enforcer’” (that is to say, the guy who was officially given 
the assignment of beating up on other players).17 In the Spawn comic 
book series, the name “Tony Twist” was used as the nickname for a fic-
tional Mafia boss, Antonio Twistelli—also something of an enforcer.18 
The well-known comic book author Todd McFarlane was Spawn’s crea-
tor and the one who came up with the names for all the characters that 
populated the series.19 In his search for names, he often used those of 
family members and friends, but McFarlane is also a hockey fan, and, to 
his undoubted regret, he sometimes used the names of professional 
hockey players for characters.20 In the overall scheme of things, the 
Twist character was not a particularly important one, appearing in only 
166 frames of a comic book series that ran to 31,000 panels.21 But the 
real Tony Twist won a $15 million publicity rights verdict for those few 
frames,22 pushing the publisher, Todd McFarlane Productions, Inc., 
into bankruptcy.23 
 Everyone, including the Supreme Court of Missouri in its 2003 
decision, Doe v. TCI Cablevision, agreed that the creation and distribu-
tion of comic books is an expressive activity protected by the First 
Amendment.24 But the court also concluded that McFarlane appropri-
ated the real Tony Twist’s name predominantly to obtain “a commercial 
advantage.”25 The court apparently felt that such behavior was so hei-
                                                                                                                      
15 See Doe v. TCI Cablevision (TCI Cablevision II ), 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003); Doe v. 
McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Doe v. TCI Cablevision (TCI Cablevision I ), 
No. ED 78785, 2002 WL 1610972 (Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002). 
16 TCI Cablevision II, 110 S.W.3d at 365. 
17 Id. at 366. 
18 See id. 
19 Id. 
20 See TCI Cablevision I, 2002 WL 1610972, at *2. 
21 See id. at *2 n.3. 
22 McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d at 56, 76. The jury in the first trial awarded $24.5 million. Id. 
at 56. 
23 Lawsuit by Former Blues Player Spawns Bankruptcy Filing by Comic-Book Company, Kan. 
City Star, Dec. 21, 2004, at C2. 
24 See TCI Cablevision II, 110 S.W.3d at 372–74. 
25 Id. at 372. 
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nous that it justified stripping McFarlane of his free speech shelter, 
even at the risk of shutting down the Spawn series.26 Why? Not, appar-
ently, because McFarlane realized any actual financial benefit from its 
use of Twist’s name. In truth, the Spawn comics were enormously suc-
cessful, and there is every reason to believe that they would have been 
so had the Twist character never made an appearance.27 Thus it is 
highly unlikely that McFarlane would have considered for a moment 
paying Twist twenty percent of his gross revenues—the amount Twist’s 
expert claimed was fair compensation and the amount the jury 
awarded at the first trial—simply for the privilege of using his name.28 
In the court’s view, however, “Twist was under no obligation to prove 
that [McFarlane] . . . actually derived a pecuniary benefit from the use 
of his name.”29 Twist needed to prove only that McFarlane appropri-
ated his identity with an intent to derive such a benefit.30 The court 
concluded that sufficient evidence of such intent was available to the 
jury because McFarlane tried to make Spawn more attractive to hockey 
fans by adopting hockey player names for various characters.31 To fur-
ther support the case for wrongful intent, the court pointed out that 
McFarlane once promoted the Spawn series at a minor league hockey 
game, including distributing products that featured the Twist charac-
ter.32 From the evidence, Twist’s contribution to the financial success of 
Spawn could at most have been minuscule, but the fact that at least 
some readers would understand the name as a reference to the actual 
hockey player was enough to bring McFarlane down. 
 It might be tempting to explain away the result of the Twist litiga-
tion as a misnamed defamation action that was really about redress for 
reputational harm. The defamation, in this theory, would arise from 
                                                                                                                      
26 See id. at 374. 
27 Plaintiff Tony Twist’s financial expert at the first trial estimated gross revenues from 
the Spawn series and related merchandising at more than $122 million. See TCI Cablevision 
I, 2002 WL 1610972, at *4. 
28 See id. 
29 TCI Cablevision II, 110 S.W.3d at 370. 
30 Id. at 370–71. 
31 Id. at 371–72. McFarlane revealed his naming practices in his responses to letters 
from Spawn fans and in an interview with a magazine editor. Id. at 366–67. 
32 Id. at 371. The most explicit publicity given to Twist, however, did not come directly 
from the defendant. Rather, an independently produced magazine feature, which focused 
on an interview with McFarlane, included a brief “bio” of Twist and a drawing of the char-
acter. See id. at 366–67. Also, the Twist character made an appearance in an animated HBO 
television series based on the Spawn comic books. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d at 72–73. McFarlane 
did not write or produce the series, although he had a significant role in creating story 
lines and overseeing the production. Id. at 73. 
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the chance that at least some readers would believe that the portrait of 
fictional mob boss Antonio Twistelli was intended to cast aspersions on 
the actual behavior or personality of the real Tony Twist. Twist actually 
filed a defamation claim in his original action, but it was dismissed by 
the trial court on the ground that Twist could not meet the constitu-
tional requirement of showing that the fictional characterization of 
Twistelli was “of and concerning” the plaintiff.33 Although the Supreme 
Court of Missouri seemed to take some issue with that conclusion,34 it 
nevertheless agreed that the appearance and behaviors of the real and 
the fictional Twists bore no similarities to one another.35 In addition to 
imposing the “of and concerning” requirement, the Constitution also 
requires defamation to be believable before it can be actionable.36 It 
strains credulity to imagine a reasonable comic book fan concluding 
that the real Twist, like the fictional one, was a Mafia don, a murderer, a 
frequenter of prostitutes, and an abductor of children.37 
 To the extent that any direct reference was intended, which 
McFarlane denied,38 the use of Twist’s name for a fictional don could at 
most be seen as a parodic salute to the real Twist’s reputation as a tough 
“enforcer.” The possibility that there would be such a connection in 
readers’ minds may have led to some financial loss for Twist because at 
least one prospective endorsement contract apparently fell through as a 
result.39 Although the company that decided not to use Twist to adver-
tise its products could not reasonably have thought that the public 
would associate Twist with a life of crime, it may well have concluded 
that the unsavory aspects of Twist’s hockey career were still insufficiently 
forgotten and that, as a result, he would not be an acceptable symbol for 
a sports nutrition company.40 If so, the real problem traces back to 
                                                                                                                      
33 See TCI Cablevision I, 2002 WL 1610972, at *15. 
34 See TCI Cablevision II, 110 S.W.3d at 370 (noting the fact that at least some readers 
did make a connection between the cartoon character and the hockey player). 
35 Id. at 366. 
36 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1990) (finding newspaper 
column implying that a wrestling coach lied under oath might reasonably be believed as a 
factual assertion); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (finding parody 
of nationally known minister engaging in drunken, incestuous relationship was not rea-
sonably believable); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14–15 (1970) 
(finding that despite use of the word “blackmail” to describe contentious development, it 
was “simply impossible to believe” that readers would understand the word to mean the 
actual crime of blackmail). 
37 See TCI Cablevision II, 110 S.W.3d at 366. 
38 Id. at 367. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. Twist apparently had been working hard on improving his public image to 
put distance between himself and the sports figure once quoted in Sports Illustrated as say-
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Twist’s actual past, not to any tongue-in-cheek reference to it by 
McFarlane. 
 In short, this was solely a claim based on a “taking” of Twist’s pub-
licity rights, and the court used an extremely odd analysis to resolve the 
conflict between Twist’s economic interests and McFarlane’s speech 
interests. It agreed that the choice of a name for a comic book charac-
ter would ordinarily be part of what the First Amendment protects, but 
it cautioned that McFarlane could rely on constitutional coverage only 
if, in exercising his choice of names, his goal was more expressive than 
commercial.41 In other words, once commercial objectives intermingle 
with expressive ones, the ordinary presumption favoring a speaker’s 
choice of what to say will no longer determine the outcome. Instead, 
the constitutional interest of the defendant and the property interest of 
the plaintiff must be weighed against one another. According to the 
court, if a jury were to conclude that McFarlane intended to enrich 
himself unjustly by choosing Tony Twist’s name for a character, 
McFarlane’s First Amendment defense would fail, and injunctive relief 
and damages (even crushing ones) could be justified.42 The balancing 
theory in this case is so open-ended, and so tilted against situations 
where expressive and commercial motivations coexist, that it is hard to 
see why magazines and newspapers would not also be routinely liable 
for the common practice of using stories and pictures of celebrities to 
boost their circulation. 
 The Supreme Court of Missouri’s approach to non-advertising 
publicity cases is extreme, but it is far from unique in permitting a bal-
ancing between speech rights and the economic interest of individuals 
in their identifying information. The more traditional formulation is 
set out in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.43 The Restatement 
asserts that the use of elements of an individual’s persona on merchan-
dise is ordinarily commercial, non-expressive and unprotected by the 
First Amendment.44 Hence, if a celebrity’s face appears on a poster or a 
coffee mug without permission, the plaintiff automatically wins. By con-
trast, uses of another’s persona in expressive works like news reports or 
                                                                                                                      
ing, “I want to hurt [the players on the other team]. I want to end the fight as soon as pos-
sible and I want the guy to remember it.” See id. at 366. 
41 See id. at 374. 
42 See id. at 374, 376. 
43 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 (1995). 
44 Id. § 47 cmt. b. 
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works of fiction are ordinarily fully protected by the First Amend-
ment.45 
 The Restatement’s protection of expressive works would seem to in-
clude comic books, and thus it might appear that states following the 
Restatement formulation would reach a different result from the Twist 
case. But the Restatement notes, “if the name or likeness is used solely to 
attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person, 
the user may be subject to liability for a use of the other’s identity in 
advertising.”46 Exactly where this formulation would leave the decision 
to nickname the fictional character Antonio Twistelli “Tony Twist” is 
uncertain. It is not too great a stretch, though, to imagine a court con-
cluding that McFarlane used Twist’s name in an “unrelated” context. 
 The most creative and influential attempt to negotiate the tricky 
terrain between publicity rights and free speech is the “transformative 
use” test articulated by the Supreme Court of California in the 2001 
case Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.47 Rather than draw 
a line between merchandise and expressive works the way the Restate-
ment does, the Comedy III court took the position that right of publicity 
claims in non-advertising cases generally are valid if the value of the 
defendant’s work is attributable primarily to the plaintiff’s persona and 
if the defendant’s use of that persona is “non-transformative.”48 Under 
this test, an artist’s highly skilled representation of the Three Stooges 
that was subsequently reproduced on tee shirts and posters was held to 
violate the performers’ publicity rights because the depiction of the trio 
was too realistic.49 
 By contrast, when musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter were 
evoked in a DC Comics series by two characters called Johnny and Ed-
gar Autumn, the Supreme Court of California ruled that the use was 
constitutionally privileged.50 In its 2003 decision, Winter v. DC Comics, 
the court agreed with the plaintiffs that some significant value of the 
cartoon characters resided in their reference to the plaintiffs.51 But the 
court found that by presenting the plaintiffs as half-worm, half-human 
villains who are ultimately wiped out in a gun battle, the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. § 47 cmts. b & c. 
46 Id. § 47 cmt. c. 
47 21 P.3d 797, 808–10 (Cal. 2001). 
48 See id. The transformative use test applies both to products and to expressive works. 
See id. at 811. 
49 Id. at 811. 
50 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 480 (Cal. 2003). 
51 See id. at 479 (noting that the characters were “less-than-subtle evocations” of the 
musicians and implying that fans might be attracted to the comic books). 
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use was transformative, and his speech rights prevailed over the plain-
tiff’s publicity rights.52 
 The Supreme Court of California’s “transformative use” approach 
is certainly more speech-protective than the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri’s “predominant use” test, in part because California does not 
count a defendant’s intent to gain a marketing advantage from the use 
against him if he contributes sufficient input of his own. Nevertheless, 
“transformative use” remains content-based and is nothing if not malle-
able. For example, in Comedy III, the Supreme Court of California sug-
gested that its ruling would not put at risk Andy Warhol’s use of celebrity 
images in his art.53 Warhol’s use, the court explained, was transforma-
tive—despite the literalness of the depictions involved—because of the 
way Warhol manipulated the “context” of what he borrowed.54 
 Each of these three approaches—transformative use, predominant 
use, and the Restatement—shares a common thread. All assume that 
because the identifying characteristics of people can have value, that 
value must be protected by a property right. And once a property right 
is identified, it is fully entitled to go head-to-head with, and will often 
defeat, a defendant’s free speech claim. As the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia admitted in explaining its ruling in Comedy III, were it to decide 
that non-transformative representations “were protected by the First 
Amendment, [it could not] perceive how the right of publicity would 
remain a viable right other than in cases of falsified celebrity endorse-
ments.”55 
 In recognizing the shaky ground occupied by publicity claims, the 
Comedy III court is not alone. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, in its influential 1996 decision about parodic baseball cards, 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association, ruled that 
products bearing likenesses and other information about celebrities 
were expressive works and that the defendant’s free speech interests in 
producing and disseminating them outweighed the plaintiffs’ eco-
nomic interests in being able to control such uses.56 Similarly, in 2007, 
                                                                                                                      
52 See id. at 479–80. 
53 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811. 
54 See id. (“Through distortion and the careful manipulation of context, Warhol was 
able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity images 
and became a form of ironic social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”). 
55 Id. 
56 See 95 F.3d 959, 972–76 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying a balancing test between the card 
maker’s First Amendment rights and the baseball players’ publicity rights). Baseball cards 
were also the subject of the first case to explicitly discuss the right of publicity. See Haelan 
Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, while purporting to 
apply Missouri law, affirmed summary judgment for a defendant in a 
case involving the unlicensed use of baseball players’ names and statis-
tics in “fantasy baseball.”57 In C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Ma-
jor League Baseball Advanced Media, the court noted that the defendants 
clearly intended to obtain a commercial advantage from using the 
names and statistics of real players, so it acknowledged the need, follow-
ing Missouri law, to balance the publicity rights of the players against 
the free speech rights of the defendants.58 The way the balancing was 
done, however, makes it hard to see how, in the Eighth Circuit, com-
mercial value could ever win. The court concluded the information 
used by the defendants—names and statistics—was all in the public 
domain and involved matters of public interest.59 How, then, could a 
defendant speaker be denied the right to use it? As if that were not 
enough, the court also added that, as long as the players were paid for 
participating in the sport and for endorsements and were not victims of 
misrepresentation or false endorsements, their remaining economic 
interests were of little concern in the constitutional scheme of things.60 
II. The Legitimacy of Balancing Free Speech Against  
Economic Interests 
 As the conflict in the courts demonstrates, the question has been 
joined: are economic interests really significant enough to defeat the 
normal presumption that speech is constitutionally protected or not? If 
so, what are the justifications for, the appropriate circumstances to 
bring, and the proper way to analyze such claims? The majority of non-
advertising publicity cases have simply assumed that balancing is ap-
propriate, and that the interests protected by publicity rights may, in 
many cases, outweigh any speech interests a party may raise. But is 
there a reasoned basis for this assumption? How do right of publicity 
protections fit within the general norms of First Amendment analysis? 
 Not easily. First, publicity rights restrict speech based on its con-
tent, which is generally something First Amendment jurisprudence re-
                                                                                                                      
57 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 
505 F.3d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). Participants in fantasy sports select actual players for 
fictional teams. These pretend teams then succeed or fail depending on how well the real 
athletes perform. 
58 Id. at 823. 
59 Id. at 823–24. 
60 See id. at 824. 
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jects.61 Although the restrictions imposed by courts and legislatures to 
protect personas are not facially viewpoint-specific, they provide a 
mechanism through which plaintiffs can control speech of which they 
do not approve. The U.S. Supreme Court’s current three-tier standard 
of review for speech regulation does not always classify restrictions in a 
predictable way,62 but once a statute or a common law right is identified 
as one that restricts speech based on its subject matter, the normal way 
to test the legitimacy of the law is by applying strict scrutiny.63 This is, of 
course, a form of balancing, but one that sets the bar for speech restric-
tions extremely high. A content-based regulation must be narrowly tai-
lored and serve some compelling state interest.64 The test is not one 
that can easily be met, and normally requires a clear showing of neces-
sity for the protection of human life, public safety, or national secu-
rity—not profit aggrandizement.65 
 How then can we understand why the prospect of profit in the 
publicity context gets the same treatment as protection of human life? 
Is there a second set of rules that might permit courts to favor eco-
nomic interests this way? Arguably, support for a “second way” might be 
drawn from two subsets of Supreme Court rulings that might appear to 
favor property over speech. One possible source of a rule favoring pub-
licity rights over speech might be drawn from cases involving dignitary 
and reputational harms. A second source resides in a small number of 
cases in which the Supreme Court has implicitly or expressly seemed to 
treat profits as a preferred interest over speech.66 In the end, however, 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies  932 (3d ed. 
2006) (“The Supreme Court frequently has declared that the very core of the First Amend-
ment is that the government cannot regulate speech based on its content.”). 
62 See id. at 760–63; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334–38 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing categories of speech in case where 
the Court determined that a ban on picketing outside embassies was not content-neutral); 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48–49(1986) (upholding a zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting adult theaters in certain districts as “completely consistent with our 
definition of ‘content-neutral’ speech” because the restrictions were not aimed at specific 
speech, but rather at its “secondary effects”). See generally Susan H. Williams, Content Dis-
crimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615 (1991) (providing a discussion of 
the line-drawing between “content neutral” and content-specific regulation). 
63 See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 Santa Clara L. Rev. 883, 909–
10 (1991). 
64 See Chemerinsky, supra note 61, at 541–42, 932–33. 
65 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
66 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–64, 578–79 (1977) 
(upholding state law damages remedy as permissible under the First Amendment when 
local television news station broadcast entire performance of entertainer’s act without 
permission). 
2009] Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights 1515 
neither source provides support for open-ended balancing of publicity 
rights against speech claims in any but the most unusual situations. 
 Of the dignitary and reputational harm cases, only defamation 
offers a glimmer of hope for publicity rights claimants. Other causes of 
action, such as the right to control the publication of private embarrass-
ing facts or intentional infliction of emotional distress, have either 
failed to succeed before the Supreme Court,67 or have been pushed 
and squeezed to fit into a narrow aperture that depends entirely on the 
existence of intentional falsification.68 Defamation, however, offers a 
clear example of permissible content-based regulation in the service of 
an interest that is obviously less pressing than life, safety, or national 
security. One could argue for an analogy between defamation’s interest 
in reputation and the right of publicity’s interests in control over a per-
son’s identifying characteristics based on several parallels between the 
two torts. Like publicity actions, defamation is intended to provide re-
dress for injuries inflicted by private parties in the pursuit of private 
objectives. Both torts vindicate an individual’s interest in controlling 
how she is perceived by others, and both are also rooted in a concern 
over the economic aftereffects of undesired or undesirable portrayals. 
 Historically, the injuries caused by defamation, like those from vio-
lations of publicity rights today, were conceived of in largely economic 
terms.69 The law of defamation took particularly seriously untruths that 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530–41 (1989) (publication of the name of a rape 
victim not actionable); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101–06 (1979) (invali-
dating a statute protecting the privacy of juvenile offenders by barring publication of their 
names); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837–46 (1978) (overturning 
criminal sanctions against newspaper for reporting on confidential judicial misconduct 
hearings). 
68 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (public figures and offi-
cials may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that 
there was a false statement of fact made with “actual malice” or “knowledge that the state-
ment was false or with reckless disregard” to the truth); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 
387–88 (1967) (plaintiffs with statutory false light invasion of privacy claims must prove 
intentional falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth). 
69 In slander or spoken defamation, economic harm from false statements injurious to 
“holders of offices and members of professions and trades” was taken so seriously that 
actual damages did not need to be proved to prevail. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A 
Concise History of the Common Law 463–64 (4th ed. 1948). This was in contrast to 
most other kinds of slander, including slanders imputing sexual misconduct to women. 
Recovery in those instances could be had, historically, only upon proof of loss of economic 
advantage (e.g., a marriage opportunity). See Thomas Atkins Street, Foundations of 
Legal Liability: A Presentation of the Theory and Development of the Common 
Law: Vol. 1: Theory & Principles of Tort 282–85 (1906). Written defamation at com-
mon law was actionable without special damages being proven. See id. at 294–95. In recent 
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injured plaintiffs in their professional or business interests, or in the 
case of women, in their economic prospects as they related to mar-
riage.70 For these reasons, one could argue that if the state has a com-
pelling interest in protecting its citizens against defamation, the same 
reasons exist in favor of protecting publicity rights. Whether those par-
allels hold on further examination, however, is questionable. Although 
one could explain the survival of libel actions as an example of First 
Amendment balancing between private interests and speech interests, 
the story is actually more complex. 
 For a long time, the reason defamation actions were not seen as 
conflicting with the First Amendment was because defamatory content, 
like fighting words and obscenity, was not treated as protected speech 
for constitutional purposes.71 Not until 1964, in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, did the Supreme Court subject a defamation claim to First 
Amendment scrutiny.72 Concerned about the possibility that large 
damage awards for libel would chill the willingness of citizens to engage 
in fully protected speech, the Court sharply limited (although it did not 
eliminate) the right of individuals to sue for reputational harm.73 Al-
though Sullivan remains an iconic decision, it was not actually very 
clear in setting out the theory under which defamation claims could 
legitimately be upheld.74 It was possible, therefore, to suppose that the 
case and its immediate successors were applying an ad hoc balancing 
test under which at least some allegations of personal harm from oth-
erwise protected speech could be compensated.75 
 If so, what is good for the goose of defamation may nevertheless 
not avail the gander of publicity rights. Although the alleged harms 
from defamation can be quite trivial, involving more insult and anger 
than actual injury, history is replete with examples where false and de-
famatory statements have in fact destroyed careers, broken friendships, 
and ruptured family relationships. The Supreme Court, for example, 
has frequently alluded to the devastating effects of harmful falsehoods 
promulgated by the Nazi regime in Germany and by Senator Joseph 
                                                                                                                      
years, the Supreme Court has largely eliminated presumed damages, requiring instead that 
actual damages be shown. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
70 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
71 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (listing defamation, 
along with fighting words and obscene speech, as excluded categories). 
72 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
73 See id. at 283 (requiring that public officials demonstrate “actual malice” in libel ac-
tions). 
74 See id. at 283–92. 
75 See id. 
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McCarthy in the United States in the 1950s.76 Thus, some empirical 
foundation exists in defamation law for attributing substantial weight to 
reputational harm in a balancing test. The economic detriment from 
having one’s name appear in a comic book or one’s face on a tee shirt 
without permission or payment, however, does not in most cases come 
close to the potential harm from defamation, particularly where know-
ing lies are involved.77 Further, as the Twist litigation demonstrates, it is 
also often doubtful that the plaintiff was actually deprived of any sig-
nificant economic benefit because the value of the use, from the de-
fendant’s perspective, is often simply too insignificant to warrant volun-
tary payment of even a token sum.78 
 The real problem with attempting to compare balancing in public-
ity rights cases with that in defamation is that the premise for the com-
parison is itself faulty. The survival of defamation as a cause of action 
cannot be attributed to ad hoc balancing. Rather, it is a function of the 
history of the tort and of the particular kind of speech involved. 
 Defamation actions were well-established in Anglo-American law 
long before the ratification of the First Amendment, and libel cases 
were tried in state courts right up to the time of Sullivan.79 An original-
ist could argue, therefore, that the Framers, to the extent that they in-
tended to achieve any substantive result by creating the First Amend-
ment, had their collective eyes solely on limiting claims of seditious 
(i.e., political) libel. Other kinds of libel remained triable in the state 
courts, suggesting that actions complaining of non-seditious but never-
theless libelous speech were never intended to be barred by the First 
Amendment. Prior to Sullivan, the Supreme Court dealt with the con-
tinuing viability of defamation by taking the consistent position that 
libelous statements were not “speech” for constitutional purposes, and 
hence libel actions did not violate the Constitution.80 When the Court 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Surely if the 
1950’s taught us anything, they taught us that the poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can 
infect and degrade a whole society.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) 
(“[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic 
government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is 
to be effected.”); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 400 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting David Ries-
man, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1088 
(1942) on the fascists’ effective use of defamatory attacks on their opponents in Europe). 
77 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 cmt. c (1995). 
78 See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text. 
79 Sullivan itself was originally brought in Alabama state court. See New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962). 
80 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (noting that libelous speech is unprotected by the 
Constitution). 
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decided Sullivan, it seems not to have changed its mind about the con-
stitutional status of defamatory speech, but rather opted to privilege 
the utterance of injurious falsehoods so that fear of liability would not 
chill the willingness of citizens to exchange ideas, opinions and infor-
mation that they could not prove were wholly accurate.81 
 The unprotected status of injurious falsehoods is reflected in other 
aspects of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence as well, including its 
commercial speech doctrine (where false or misleading statements can 
freely be regulated) and its treatment of such speech torts as false light 
invasions of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.82 
Clearly, where injurious falsehoods are the subject of a lawsuit, the 
Court gives the state much more latitude in regulation than it does 
where accurate speech or opinion is involved.83 The Court’s rationale is 
not that injurious falsehoods require special dispensation from speech 
protection. Rather, it is that the speech was never protectable in the 
first place.84 Thus, publicity law can draw on the analogy to defamation 
to justify sanctioning liability for false endorsements but not for much 
else. It is not a template for justifying restrictions on the kind of creative 
expression produced by either Gary Saderup in Comedy III or Todd 
McFarlane in the Twist litigation. 
                                                                                                                      
81 See 376 U.S. at 282–83. This is similar to the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence. Al-
though obscene speech is unprotected by the Constitution, the Court has been careful to 
limit what can be deemed obscene so as to immunize sexually explicit but fully protected 
speech. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157–61 (1974) (noting that the community 
standards test from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), had to be applied with care to 
distinguish speech that was obscene from sexual content in a popular film like Carnal 
Knowledge). 
82 In the case of the latter speech torts, the Court has thus far been unwilling to permit 
liability unless the plaintiff can show that the speech in question was intentionally false. For 
example, in the 1988 case Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court expressed serious doubt 
that the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress could rise to the level that would 
warrant limiting free speech rights, but said that in any event, minister Jerry Falwell, as a 
public figure, would at a minimum have to show knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for 
the truth to recover. See 485 U.S. at 52–56. The Court agreed that the cartoon depicting Fal-
well was not factually accurate (even intentionally so), but it also took note of the conclusion 
below that no one would understand the cartoon as conveying factual information. See id. at 
57. In both the false light cases decided thus far by the Court, it also required a showing of 
knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 
U.S. 245, 252–54 (1974); Hill, 385 U.S. at 390. See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False 
Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 364 (1989) (providing a dis-
cussion of false light and the significance of the truth/falsity distinction). 
83 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (states are free to set the standard of liability in defamation 
cases brought by private persons involved in matters of public interest so long as a finding 
of fault is required). 
84 See id. at 339–40 (noting that there is no constitutional value in intentional or care-
less untruths). 
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 The second source of Supreme Court precedent supplies a more 
relevant and convincing justification for publicity rights cases like those 
brought to protect the Three Stooges or Tony Twist. These are cases 
that permit exclusive rights in non-copyrightable content on the 
grounds that protecting such rights will incentivize innovation.85 Under 
this line of reasoning, publicity rights must be protected for the same 
reasons we privilege commercial and creative interests through copy-
rights or trademarks. Pro-publicity advocates have gotten considerable 
mileage from the fact that the Supreme Court has drawn just this paral-
lel in its seminal case dealing with publicity rights, Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.86 Justice White, writing for the majority, noted 
that “the State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protect-
ing the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to en-
courage such entertainment” and that this interest “is closely analogous 
to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the 
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors . . . .”87 
 The Zacchini case should not be read, however, as an endorsement 
by the Court for upholding traditional publicity claims in the face of all 
constitutional challenges. The issues in Comedy III and the Twist litiga-
tion, for example, bear little relation to the problem that existed in Zac-
chini. The plaintiff, Hugo Zacchini, was an entertainer who sued a tele-
vision news station for broadcasting footage of his human cannonball 
act without his consent.88 The complaint was not predicated merely on 
the fact that the defendant had used Zacchini’s name or his physical 
appearance without his permission; rather, Zacchini objected to the 
fact that the performance from which he earned a livelihood was aired 
in its entirety.89 He argued that if people who might otherwise pay to 
witness his performance could see it for free on television and he was 
not compensated, he would lack any incentive to continue developing 
acts and offering them to the public.90 
 Although Justice White used the term “right of publicity” to de-
scribe Zacchini’s cause of action and used broad language to the effect 
that no one had a free speech right to interfere with another’s eco-
                                                                                                                      
85 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–79 ( justifying state law publicity rights on incentive 
grounds); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569–71 (1973) ( justifying state anti-music 
piracy statute on incentive grounds). 
86 See 433 U.S. at 562. 
87 Id. at 573. 
88 Id. at 563–64. 
89 See id. at 564, 575–76. 
90 See id. 
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nomic interests, he was nevertheless careful to emphasize the unusual 
facts of the case: that an entire performance was used.91 “The broadcast 
of petitioner’s entire performance,” White wrote, “goes to the heart of 
petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”92 According to 
White, this made Zacchini’s claim far stronger than claims regarding 
“the unauthorized use of another’s name for purposes of trade or the 
incidental use of a name or picture by the press.”93 White also pointed 
out that the injury to free speech done by permitting Zacchini’s claim 
to succeed was substantially mitigated by the fact that the performer 
was not claiming a right to enjoin anyone from using the footage of his 
act; all he wants, said White, “is to be paid.”94 
 The idea that some protection against misappropriation must exist 
to allow a plaintiff to reap whatever benefits might flow from his core 
work product resonates with other earlier Supreme Court decisions, 
even though they were not decided on free speech grounds. In 1918, in 
International News Service v. Associated Press, the Court upheld a misap-
propriation claim filed by the Associated Press (the “AP”) to protect the 
contents of its news wire stories.95 The Court explained that its decision 
was intended to give the AP some space to benefit from its newsgather-
ing activities before its competitor, International News Service, could 
take the information the AP had gathered and use it to compete 
against the AP in its own markets.96 In Goldstein v. California, in 1973, 
the Court refused to preempt a state law prohibiting piracy of sound 
recordings at a time when such recordings were unprotected by copy-
right.97 The Court’s decision was apparently driven by the concern that 
if copyists could duplicate and sell the sound recordings that someone 
else had invested in producing, the record industry might lose its in-
centive to continue producing records.98 
 If these cases can be said to have a common theme, it is that prop-
erty rights can take priority over speech rights if and when it can be 
shown that without speech restrictions, total market failure will result. 
Freedom of speech is not nihilistic; Zacchini suggests that the right of 
free speech must be tempered when the consequence of not doing so is 
                                                                                                                      
91 See id. In this case, the entire performance consisted of a fifteen-second flight from 
the cannon. Id. at 564. 
92 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 578. 
95 See 248 U.S. 215, 236–46 (1918). 
96 See id. at 239–41. 
97 See 412 U.S. at 570–71. 
98 See id. at 550–51, 555, 570–71. 
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to prevent future content from being produced at all.99 The analytical 
framework within which such cases fit is uncertain, though. Is Zacchini 
an instance of the application of strict scrutiny or a discrete category 
unto itself? Whether or not one could characterize the prevention of 
market failure in speech production as a compelling state interest is a 
good subject for debate, but the result at least makes a kind of intuitive 
sense as long as the theory is reserved for those limited situations where 
the risk of market failure seems particularly convincing.100 
 The typical non-advertising publicity case, as Justice White inti-
mated in Zacchini, falls far from meeting this standard. Market failure is 
not threatened. Although a plaintiff may argue that the public reso-
nance of his persona has potential value and allowing others to use it 
for free and without permission is therefore a taking of property, it is 
typically not the sort of taking that will lead to a failure to produce pub-
lic personas. A football player or a film star who never earns a cent 
from controlling how others present their images to the public will still 
have every incentive to burnish his public persona just to get ahead in 
his primary professional sphere. 
 As scholars have noted, fame is at a minimum a joint creation of 
the high-visibility individual and the public.101 Thus, even in the rare 
case in which the cultivation of fame alone, without some accompany-
ing talent or accomplishments, is the individual’s claim to our atten-
tion, it is far from clear why the elements of the persona that attract 
public notice should be private property rather than part of the public 
domain. As the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition observes: 
                                                                                                                      
99 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576–78. 
100 For example, in the 1997 case Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that use of “real-time” game scores and other tabu-
lated information did not constitute misappropriation because it was not equivalent to the 
“hot news” that was deemed quasi-property in Associated Press. See 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 
1997). The court held that misappropriation of information could be actionable only 
where: 
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the information 
is time-sensitve; (iii) a defendant’s use of the information constitutes free rid-
ing on the plaintiff’s efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct competition with a 
product or service offered by the plaintiffs; (v) and the ability of other parties 
to free-ride would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service 
that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened. 
Id. The court also distinguished between cases in which plaintiff merely loses a “competi-
tive edge” and cases “where the free-riding create[s] the danger of no . . . service being 
viable.” Id. at 854 n.9. 
101 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 184–95 (1993). 
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The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity 
are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in 
trademarks or trade secrets. The commercial value of a per-
son’s identity often results from success in endeavors such as 
entertainment or sports that offer their own substantial re-
wards. Any additional incentive attributable to the right of 
publicity may have only marginal significance. In other cases 
the commercial value acquired by a person’s identity is largely 
fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by 
the individual, thus diminishing the weight of the property 
and unjust enrichment rationales for protection.102 
 Vague invocations of theories such as unjust enrichment to explain 
why publicity claims should trump free speech lack persuasive power 
unless one can establish what makes the accurate utilization of publicly 
known information for First-Amendment-protected activity “unjust.” If 
information can be walled off from First Amendment protection simply 
because it has potential economic value to someone, then the content 
we are “free” to use will be greatly diminished indeed. Virtually any 
content that might interest anyone else can have some potential “value” 
if exclusive rights to it are awarded. As I have argued elsewhere, going 
very far down the road of propertizing such value would decimate both 
the concept of a free speech public domain and the First Amendment’s 
social and liberty-protecting utility.103 
 In short, money is important, and we take seriously protecting 
people’s ability to make it. Wealth-maximization and efficient exploita-
tion of assets, though, are not the values that the Bill of Rights holds 
most dear. More than a hint of that fact can be found in an interesting, 
if somewhat obscure, opinion by the Supreme Court in the 1985 deci-
sion Lowe v. SEC.104 Lowe had nothing to do with publicity rights, but the 
case provides an interesting insight into the Supreme Court’s modern 
thinking on the relationship between economic and liberty interests. 
Lowe involved regulation of the securities markets, an area where 
speech concerns are seldom raised.105 The defendant, Christopher 
Lowe, was convicted on a variety of charges including misappropriating 
a client’s funds, and as a consequence was permanently barred from 
                                                                                                                      
102 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 cmt. c (1995). 
103 See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? 
One View of the Public Domain, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 297 (2004). 
104 472 U.S. 181, 181 (1985). 
105 See id. at 183–88. 
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engaging in investment advising.106 When he subsequently turned to 
selling newsletters containing investment advice to subscribers, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission sought to enjoin their publica-
tion.107 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
refused to issue the injunction, holding that Lowe’s newsletters were 
protected by the First Amendment.108 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reversed on the ground that it was constitutionally 
permissible to regulate speech in the interests of commerce, and held 
that Lowe could be barred from selling advice, even to willing subscrib-
ers.109 The Supreme Court then reversed the Second Circuit.110 
 The Court acknowledged the strong state interest in preventing 
abuses in the securities industry, but strongly intimated that where 
speech was affected, there were limits on how far such regulation could 
go.111 The majority followed its normal practice of avoiding, wherever 
possible, basing its decision on constitutionality, instead resting its hold-
ing on an interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.112 Al-
though the Act did not distinguish between giving investment advice 
directly to clients and delivering it via a newspaper or journal,113 the 
Court concluded that the intent of the statute was to treat the two dif-
ferently.114 As Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, understood the 
law through the lens of its legislative history: 
Congress was primarily interested in regulating the business of 
rendering personalized investment advice, including publish-
ing activities that are a normal incident thereto. On the other 
hand, Congress, plainly sensitive to First Amendment con-
cerns, wanted to make clear that it did not seek to regulate 
                                                                                                                      
106 See id. at 183–84. 
107 See id. at 184–85. 
108 See id. at 186. 
109 See id. at 187. 
110 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211. 
111 See id. at 189–203. 
112 See id. at 190–211. Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the re-
sult, but would have reached the constitutional question. See id. at 211 (White, J., concur-
ring). Justice White wrote that the statute was, in fact, unambiguous in reaching both indi-
vidualized investment advice and advice rendered through a publication. See id. at 227. Its 
application to publishers like Lowe, he argued, to further a general goal of ridding the 
market of “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative” advice was clearly unconstitutional. See 
id. at 234. 
113 See id. at 203–04 (majority opinion). 
114 See id. at 204. 
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the press through the licensing of nonpersonalized publish-
ing activities.115 
The Court agreed that the statute was justified in requiring an invest-
ment advisor to register with the government to advise clients in one-
on-one fiduciary relationships, where experience had shown substantial 
risk of “fraud, deception, or overreaching” absent such regulation.116 
But where the communications are impersonal, and no showing can be 
made of wrongdoing, the Court held that an individual’s right to pub-
lish financial advice was protected and fell outside the Act.117 Thus 
Lowe, like Zacchini, makes allowances for regulating speech in the inter-
ests of economic well-being, but only when the risks are significant, 
highly particularized, and non-speculative.118 
Conclusion 
 Where does all this point? Arguably, to the end of the vast majority 
of publicity claims involving non-advertising uses. Except for special 
cases where misrepresentation occurs or where a plaintiff can demon-
strate high risk of failure in the primary market for his talents, the ar-
gument for giving plaintiffs compensation for and control over their 
personas rests on no more than thin and speculative justifications. 
Awarding Tony Twist $15 million to compensate him for the “value” of 
using his name in 166 frames of a comic book series, therefore, is to-
tally puzzling—and seems entirely wrong-headed—as a matter of free 
speech theory. The trope of elevating the appearance of harm in pub-
licity rights by classifying it as monetary rather than purely dignitary is a 
clever one because historically courts have tended to think that money 
occupies territory the Bill of Rights does not reach. It does not com-
pute, though. Using information without permission is not like robbing 
a bank. Property rights in copyrighted speech are one thing; but reach-
ing beyond copyright to commodify the value in personal information 
presents risks to the public domain that should be incurred rarely and 
only for good (dare I say compelling?) reasons. As a general matter, 
does a property right in public personas meet that standard? How many 
ways are there to spell “no”? 
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